Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won re-election, extending his increasingly authoritarian rule into a third decade as the country reels from high inflation and the aftermath of an earthquake that levelled entire cities.
A third term gives. Erdoğan, a polarizing populist, an even stronger hand domestically and internationally, and the election results will have implications far beyond the capital of Ankara. Turkey stands at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and it also plays a key role in NATO.
Turkey is now commencing another five-year term under Erdoğan with an AK Party-led alliance holding a majority in the parliament. Given the presidential system and with a parliament majority behind him, the re-election of Erdoğan will give Turkey a five-year stable term without elections, except for municipal elections scheduled to be held in March 2024. Erdoğan’s re-election means Turkey will be entering another era of centralized decision-making, however this five-year term can also be regarded as securing political stability for Turkey. If Turkey’s economic team can go back to credible and more conventional economic policies that can fix the current problems through setting strong economic benchmarks and implementing crucial structural reforms, then Turkey can become a destination for foreign capital in time, given the current state of other emerging markets.
The Turkish economy currently has serious problems, including a high inflation rate and low currency reserves caused in part by a controlled exchange rate regime. Current unconventional policy is not helping Turkey achieve a high growth rate or a boost in its exports. In short, the economy needs to be addressed quickly. It is important for Erdoğan and the new government to reassure confidence in the Turkish economy both for domestic and foreign investors. With a strong economic team and more conventional and independent policies, this is possible. In his victory remarks, President Erdoğan discussed the Turkish economy at length, which shows that he is determined to deliver a stronger road map for the economy.
In the run-up to the second round of voting, it was an open question as to whether Erdoğan, who had promised to serve only one more five-year term, would burnish his legacy by easing some of the harsh measures imposed against his liberal and leftist political opponents and minority communities.
But in a pair of victory speeches in Istanbul and Ankara, Erdoğan was hardly magnanimous in victory. He dispensed quickly with the obligatory post-election call to put aside differences. “There will be no losers in such a victory. The winner is Turkey,” he said, dutifully thanking all Turks who voted.
But the tone quickly darkened. He slammed his opponent Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as incompetent and smirked as the crowd booed him. He described jailed Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas and other political opponents as “terrorists.”
He accused the Anglophone, French, and German media outlets covering Turkey of trying to overthrow him. He drew howls of delight from the crowd when he warned that opposition parties were pursuing a pro LGBTQIA+ Agenda. “For us, family is sacred,” he said.
He also warned that he would prevent political opponents from damaging Turkey’s “success with other people and other intermediaries,” suggesting plausible crack-down on journalists, human-rights campaigners, and political dissidents who attempted to pressure Ankara by appealing to international governments and institutions.
Erdoğan’s post-election posturing suggests he may have already settled on a path of demonizing vulnerable minorities and targeting political opponents to retain social control ahead of potentially rough economic times.
When an incumbent president wins re-election—as Erdoğan has in Turkey by a roughly 52-48 margin—one expects more continuity than change in foreign policy. For Erdoğan, this means hewing to three pillars that have evolved as the basis for Turkish foreign policy under his lead: strategic semi-independence (anchored by NATO with expansive caveats), balancing and hedging among great powers, and a carrot-and-stick mixture of hard power and adaptive diplomacy in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood.
NATO remains the cornerstone of Turkish security, and Ankara has spoken in Favor of admitting Ukraine and Georgia. After extracting concessions on defense cooperation and prosecution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror group, the Turkish parliament approved Finland’s accession in March. As Sweden’s new counter-terror legislation takes full effect next month, the prospects for Swedish accession are looking up. Under Erdoğan’s upcoming presidential term, Turkey will remain a strong contributor to the Alliance’s training, readiness, and mutual defense missions.
Should the war in Ukraine end during his presidential term, Erdoğan can be expected to continue offering strong defense partnership to Ukraine, as he has for the past decade.
Yet NATO membership offers little help to Erdoğan in an arc of conflict and tension with Russia that spans Turkey’s eastern and southern borders. The counter-PKK campaigns in Iraq and Syria, standoffs in the Caucasus and Libya, and the unresolved Syrian civil war all require that Erdoğan alternately deter and negotiate with Moscow, Tehran, Damascus, and other regional powers without much help from the West. One might add the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, where Turkey butts heads with Greece and Cyprus, necessitating an independent approach. In this “zone beyond NATO” for Turkish security, Erdoğan is likely to leave the door open for deals while rattling the saber occasionally for effect.
Syria stands out as a matter of personal legacy for Erdoğan; he will want to remove the PKK-linked People’s Defence Units (YPG) from the Turkish border, while facilitating the safe return of significant numbers of Syrian refugees to their homeland. What mixture of diplomatic finesse and military threats compels Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to provide assurances on refugee protection and border security remains to be seen.
The International community will undoubtedly be closely monitoring Turkey’s next steps, hoping for a reaffirmation of democratic principles and a commitment to upholding human rights and freedoms. Ultimately, Turkey’s re-election serves as a reminder that the fate of democracy lies in the hands of its citizens and their collective will to forge a prosperous, inclusive, and democratic society.
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